basis of Albert's Metaphysica 4, tL l, However, he notes that Albert also attribut es ta metaphysics the study of the efficient and material causes as weil; this is inasmuch as metaphysics studies ail beings (among which are efficient and material causes) (p. 129, using texts from Albert, Metaph. 3, tL 2).
Doig goes on to contrast St. Thomas with these positions. He says that, in his presentation of CM 4.1, he has already mentioned that Thomas earlier in CM "explained that metaphysics studies ail four causes" (p. 129). Now he turns to CM 3.4, St. Thomas' ex professa treatment of Aristotle's first problem. Doig stresses the importance of the question at issue: "Obviously, the answer given to the difficulty will completely determine the science of metaphysics: the object, the method. the relationship to the other sciences -ail is affected." (p. 130) He points out that Aristotle has given no answer in Book 3, but he never alludes to the fact that, for St. Thomas, Aristotle never explicitly answers the question. St. Thomas says he has been able to gather a solution from doctrines in various parts of the Metaphysics. 9 Doig speaks about how elaborate St. Thomas' treatment is, but when he cornes to tell us what the doctrine is, he says:
"As Albert, so Thomas too says that ail four causes are studied. As bath A verroes and Albert, Thomas says that to study being as su ch means above ail to study the formai cause; yet unlike his predecessors, Thomas does not ho Id that one studies especially form because the form is the principle of our knowledge; rather one studies form because beings have their perfection from the formai cause ... And finally, Thomas parts company with A verroes, but joins Albert, in nothing [read: noting] 10 that metaphysics studies the material cause due to the fact that sorne beings are material." (p. 131)
As he goes on, Doig examines the merits of Albert's and Thomas' diverse reasons for metaphysics' study of the formai cause. He says that Thomas' reason goes deeper th an Albert's (which is supposed to be that the knowledge of the formai cause gives us the greatest knowledge of a thing), implicitly explaining Albert's reason. Thus, Doig continues: " ... because the form of a thing is the source of what the thing is. Thus Thomas says, we study the formai cause of being as such. As Thomas indicates, Book r (IV) explains that it is the metaphysician who studies being as such, and not the naturai philosopher, since sorne beings are not natural, that is not material. Now it would follow from this -and this is Thomas' point -that ta study what ail beings have in common is to study the formai cause ... only by studying what is corn mon to ail substances (name1y form) can one study being as such." (pp. 132-133) Il In his resumé (pp. 139-140) Doig unites the materials from CM 3.4 and 4.1. He says:
"Metaphysics studies ail four causes: the formai cause because the form is the source of a thing's perfection; the final cause, because first substances are to be studied and they are the final causes of other beings; the efficient cause, again because one studies first substances; the material cause, because sorne beings are ma terial. "
The first thing to be noted (we intend to speak only of St. Thomas and St. Albert, not of Averroes) is that in treating of this first Aristotelian problem, Doig has failed to use the third tractate of Albert's Metaphysica 3. In tr. 2, used by Doig, Albert presents a first discussion of the problems. Tr. 3 is a second, more ample treatment of the same problems, and is written entirely in the "digressive" mode, i.e. dispenses with the paraphrase format in favour of a more comprehensive discussion. 12 In tr. 3, the first chapter is on the first problem. In the course of presenting the difficulty, Albert introduces the opinion of Avicenna that cause and caused are a division proper to ens, and so belong properly to the first philosopher: and so Avicenna says that the knowledge concerning ail the causes belongs only to the first philosopher. 13 Albert further wonders why Aristotle, in Book l, first inquired into the number and sorts of cause, and then, in Book 2, showed that they were finite, and now here asks whether ail this is really his task or not. The implication is that the question must have something else in mind than the study of causes as beings.
Albert accordingly judges "without prejudice to a better opinion" that the knowledge of causes can be inquired into by one same science in three ways: (1) as something sought and eventually concluded to (we may suppose, as in Book 1), and (2) as part of the subject, or the subject, concerning which something is concluded (we may suppose, as in Book 2, where it was shown that the causes are finite), and (3) as a means or principle, through which one concludes that which one concludes concerning the subject or part ofit. Now, says Albert, in this present question, we are not asking about the causes in the first or second way, though Avicenna's argument seems to suggest that we are. Here, the issue is solely about the third way. Albert says that this was the way he treated it earlier, in tr. 2, in accordance with Aristotle's own intention. 14 cause of being, prior to ail moving causality (the whole of 213.33-214.56 should be noted). Doig (p. 202), in beginning his own reply to his question, says of Albert: "If he did, he has certainly left no trace of his proof in his exposition of Book A ". This does not seem correct. At bk, Il, tr. 2, c. 1 (ed. Cologne, 16/2, 482.39-71), on Aristotle at 1071b4-6, Albert takes the single sentence of Aristotle as a complete argument and spells it out, just in itself. This is not an argument from motion, but from substance, generation and corruption. And it seems to prove a cause of being. Cf. also our forthcoming paper, "The Distinctiveness of St. Thomas Aristotle's order of procedure, cf. 139.1-9; on the three ways, cf. 139.10-23.
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In his ultimate resolution of the problem, Albert says that since the mat hematician considers things conceived with matter according to being [esse] and separate from matter according to notion [ratio] , and the efficient and final causes are causes of esse rather than of ratio, neither the efficient nor the fïnal cause is used in mathematics. But in metaphysics [in divinis] there is consideration especially of esse, and the principles of esse are prior to esse mobile, and ail the kinds of cause are principles of esse. Thus, the metaphysician demonstrates through al! the kinds of cause. Though the cause "whence motion" and the matter and the end seem to be principles of the mobile as mobile, nevertheless there is an immobile cause "whence motion"; and there is a matter not determined through the subject of change and motion, but rather through this, that it itself is constituting the foundation of that which is [fundans ens), and individuating and standing under entity [individuans et substans entitat/]: and these roles are prior to the subject of motion, since only that which is founded [fundatum) and an individual and something standing under is subject to change and motion, but the converse is not true, i.e. that every founded and individuated thing, every intrinsically substantive thing [substans in seipso], is subject to change and motion. And Albert continues by presenting the properly metaphysical conception of the final cause. 15
Thus, Albert has made the genuine meaning of the question: what kinds of cause does the metaphysician use in order to demonstrate his conclusions. And to the question as so understood, he gives as the proper answer: ail four causes. And he has provided this answer by presenting properly metaphysical modes of ail four causes. Whereas in the earlier presentation, in tr. 2, he brought in the material cause through using what he has in tf. 3 described as the first two ways of understanding the question,16 here in tr. 3 he brings matter in in the way that the question is really meant. 17
We are now in a position to appreciate St. Thomas' treatment of the problem. The first thing to determine is how he understands the problem. And he is quite explicit from the start: "Therefore he [Aristotle) says that the first query is ... whether the consideration of the four causes, according to the four kinds, pertains to one science, or to 15 The science of metaphysics considers the material cause, as such, in no way. The reason is that matter is not universally 21 a cause of ens, but is a cause of sorne determinate genus, namely mobile substance. Such causes pertain to particular sciences, not to metaphysics.
Following this, in the text of St. Thomas, cornes the "nisi forte" remark. Of course, one can say that such causes, i.e. particular causes, are considered by this science inasmuch as they are contained under ens: in that way, metaphysics talks about aIl things. This last remark is c1early outside the proper mode of the question -i.e. by what causes does the metaphysician demonstrate? We have dropped into the Avicennian (or an even more remote) treatment of the question.
What emerges here is quite a definite opposition between St. Thomas and St. Albert. Both are very c1ear on the sense of the question. St. Albert provides a notion of a strictly metaphysical material cause. St. Thomas quite definitely refuses to accept it. Albert proposes a matter prior to the subject of change, a cause of esse. St. Thomas will have none of it. Now what about Doig's treatment of St. Thomas and St. Albert on the formaI cause? First, we might note that St. Albert does not limit himself to saying that the formai cause is primary because it is the principle of knowledge. He says that the reason for it being principle of knowledge is that it is the princip le of substance as substance, and of "ens in eo quod ens",22 Albert says he himself has often said this, and one of the places to which we are referred by the editor shows us Albert, in the very act of paraphrasing Aristotle, inc1uding the reason why form gives more knowledge, viz: 
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"For though someone may know the same thing in many ways, we say indeed that he more fully knows who through demonstration says that thing in its own formai esse, what the thing itself is according to substance, which is the 'what' and the' on account of what', than he who does not know su ch substantial esse of the thing," 23 Doig at least once uses the following formula to express what he sees as the deeper reason stated by St. Thomas for the study of form in metaphysics: " ... because the form is the source of what the thing is." (p. 132) Now, this is very close to Albert as quoted above.
Indeed, what one might wonder about in Doig's presentation is the way he treats St. Thomas. He constantly paraphrases St. Thomas on the reason for the study of form in metaphysics; thus, "one studies form because beings have their perfection from the formai cause" (p. 131); "because the form is the source of what a thing is. Thus Thomas says, we study the formai cause of being as such" (132); 24 "because the form is the source of a thing's perfection" (p. 140, also p. 335).
Let us look at what St. Thomas says. He begins his gathering of Aristotle's position by a reference to Book 4: "F or he determines in Book 4 that this science considers ens inasmuch as it is ens: and so it belongs to it to consider the primary substances, and not to natural science, since above mobile substance there are other substances." 25 Here, then, we have metaphysics and "two things" to consider, so to speak, viz ens and primary substances.
Next, St. Thomas settles the question of the cause used to demonstrate, as regards the consideration of ens:
"But every substance either is ens through itself, if it is form alone, or else, if it is composed out of matter and form, it is ens through its form ; hence, inasmuch as this science undertakes to consider ens, it considers most of ail the formai cause." 26 St. Thomas gives no reference here, probably because it is too clear that this is the doctrine of Books 7 and 8. 27 The argument of St. Thomas is clear also. The cause (hence the repeated use of "through" [per]) of ens is form : i.e. if a thing itself isform, then it is ens through itself, [23] [24] [25] [26] [27] [28] [29] [30] [31] It is our intention in the rest of this paper to follow out to sorne extent this doctrine of metaphysics as using the formai cause especially, insofar as metaphysics is considerativa entis: as this can be seen in CM 7 and 8. But before leaving the solution to the first problem, let us note the brief remarks made about the final and moving causes St. Thomas (see the text as quoted above, p. 286), having dealt with metaphysics as considerativa entis, th en directs his, attention ta the other target of metaphysical investigation established in Book 4, namely the primary substances: and the point is that we cannot know them in such a way as to know what they are. He says that this is had in a way [aliqualiter] from Book 9. 29 Going on to say, then, that accordingly formai causality has no place in metaphysics as it undertakes to consider the primary substances [considerativa primarum substantiarum], St. Thomas puts the main insistence on the final cause of motion, just as one finds in Aristotle's Book 12, though once again St. Thomas does not bother to give a reference. 3o The addition concerning the moving cause "in a way" [aliqualiter causam moventem] could hardly be more cryptic. 31 It is clear enough from what we have seen that St. Thomas' position is that metaphysics makes no use of the material cause for demonstration, and that as considerativa entis metaphysics is primarily knowledge throughformal causality. This at any rate Îs St. Thomas' interpretation of Aristotle. One would expect, then, that 28. If this picture contains any difficulty (and 1 do not consider it a major difficulty), it is in the notion of the "through itself', which gives a cause-effect or dual schema to what is one. for the order of Books 7 and 8, we find quite a definite approach different from that of, e.g., Albert the Great.34 The point of doctrine which St. Thomas exploits to the maximum in presenting Books 7 and 8 is the distinction between the merely logical mode of consideration, and the mode of consideration which penetra tes to the proper principles of things: let us cali the latter the "philosophical" or even the "existential" consideration. 35 Thus, if we look at the introduction to Book 8, we read: This contrast is carried over into what cornes next in Book 8, namely Aristotle's review of what has been seen about substance and his proposaI of what remains to be seen. St. Thomas divides Aristotle's presentation of substances so that Aristotle is first speaking about "substances existing in reality" [quae dicuntur substantiae in rerum natura existentes].39 Sorne of these aIl admit, viz sensible substances. Sorne are proposed by a few people, viz the Platonic Ideas and the mathematicals. The other division of substance is "according to the viewpoint of the notion" [secundum rationis acceptionemV o One of these is the quiddity or "what it is" of the natural thing. The other is the substance in the doctrine that genus is more a substance than species, universal more than singular (which doctrine ties in with the argument concerning the Ideas).
This division having been made, St. Thomas understands Aristotle's statement of what has been do ne and what remains to be done in accordance with it. In Book 7 we have had the complete discussion concerning substance and notions [de rationibus et de substantia], i.e. the quiddity has been discussed, and the univers al has been shown not to be substance. It remains to discuss substances existing in reality [substantias ... quae in rerum natura existunt].41 The ones posited by a few will be discussed in the last books (13 and 14, presumably). Now (in the present Book 8), we will discuss those substances which aIl admit are, i.e. the sensible ones [quas omnes confitentur esse; 42 this is esse as in rerum natura subsistere].43
Enough has been said to show the importance ofthis distinction between logical and concrete or existential consideration for the Metaphysics as read by St. Thomas. Let us now look at the way St. Thomas uses the distinction in various stages of CM 7 and 8. We should note first of aIl that St. Thomas had already announced that he understood the distinction between 7 and 8 in the way we have just seen. He did so at 7.3, in explaining for the first time the order of procedure in treating of sensible substances. He says:
38. It need hardly be said that our procedure of underlining the words of Aristotle in St. Thomas' paraphrase is highly approximative. Nevertheless. it serves to give the general picture of the commentator at work. ] is the substance, which is quod quid erat esse. And with a view to showing this, he lays down as a preliminary [praemittit] that the substance, which is quod quid erat esse, has the role of principle and cause: and that is the intention of this chapter." 47 Here, then, once more, we have the characterization of Book Ts treatment, and most explicitly of its positive part, as a logical presentation. And it is made perfectly clear that St. Thomas regards what Aristotle has so far done as falling short of knowledge of the real. The chapter 17 itself is assigned the doctrine that the substance as quod quid erat esse is a principle and a cause, just as St. Thomas said in 7.3 (1306). And we see that this is regarded as a kind of preliminary point, preparatory for the treatment of the reality of quidditative substance.
But there is more here which pertains to our study, in the word-by-word presentation of Aristotle. St. Thomas says: "He therefore says firstly that now that it has been shown that nothing of things said universally is substance, as the Platonists held, let us say what in truth must be called 'substance', viz which is quod quid erat esse, a~d of what sort this substance is: whether, that is, it is form, or matter, or something like that; and this, 1 say, let us say inserting or announcing, as il were, a starting-point other th an that logical starting-point, by which we entered, at the beginning of Book 7, into the investigation of the aforesaid substance ... And he adds what that other starting-point is by which one is to enter into the proposed inquiry, saying that Jrom here one is ta proceed towards the manifestation of the aforementioned substance, that we know that in the substance itself there is [or: it is] sorne principle and some cause." 48 Here we see that the new starting-point is not regarded as logical, and that its positive content is that in the substance (the composite, apparently), it (the reality which is, or which lies behind, the quiddity) is a principle and a cause. One can see to what extent St. Thomas' procedure constitutes a definite interpretation by considering that for St. Albert, at this point, not only has chapter 17 been treated as part of the treatise on substance as non-universal (although as a kind ofreturn to the truth at the end of it),49 but we read this:
"Therefore, let us begin by saying that, certainly, of the composite sensible substance, which is the 'this something', there is sorne principle and sorne cause which is the quiddity of it. And though we showed this above through the definition, nevertheless now, in order that the doctrine be more certain, we will show the same thing through the natural question about anything whatsoever, and these two manifestations are logical. Hence, therefore, it will be c1ear that such substances have sorne substance [as] principle and cause." 50 Albert has favoured the "iterum" in Aristotle's text,51 thus understanding that the quiddity has already been shown as principle and cause. And while he says this was done by means of the definition, he regards the novelty of the present moment, not as the very doctrine of "cause and principle", as in St. Thomas, but in the technique of using the doctrine of natural questions. Moreover, almost as if he meant to contradict the text of St. Thomas' CM, he says that this second approach, like the first, is logical. 52 Turning back to St. Thomas, we have now seen that for him Book 7 differs from Book 8 in that the former uses logical consideration while the latter treats of the 48. Ibid. The underlining represents the text of Aristotlc.
Il is to be noted that Doig, who gives much prominence to "the logical method" in his reconstruction of St. Thomas principles proper to eXlstmg substances. And we have seen that 7.17 marks a transition to the new mode of consideration, seemingly by shifting the approach from definition to causality. However, we must now look further at Book 7, for while globally we can say it employs logical consideration, this is not the whole story for St. Thomas.
The most telling passage for the study of the situation is CM 7.11 (1535-1536). Aristotle, at an earlier point in Book 7, had concluded that the quiddity, and the thing whose quiddity it is, are identical, and even notionally identical. Non-identity of these means that one is faced with mere ens per accidens. 53 However, now, at Metaph. 7.11 (1037 a33-b7), Aristot1e says that things which include matter do not have identity of quiddity and thing. In explaining this change of doctrine, St. Thomas says that the earlier doctrine was true for the logical consideration of quod quid erat esse. Here, at 7.11, Aristotle has "descended ta the natural princip les which are the matter and the form, and showed how they are diversely related ta the universal, and to the particuiar which subsists in nature". And sa, explains St. Thomas, Aristotle exclu des from his previous judgment of identity of quiddity and thing "material substances existing in reality" [substantias materia/es in rerum natura existentes].'4
From this, we can see that Book 7, though for St. Thomas it is dominated by the logical consideration, is not entirely uniform, but involves the introduction of the real princip/es of things (matter and form) as weil.
Let us now examine the procedure of "Iogical consideration", together with sorne statements of St. Thomas about it, to get a better idea of what is meant. We should begin with CM 7.3 (1308-1309). Paraphrasing Aristotle, St. Thomas says:
"He says firstly that one must speak first of sensible substances, and quod quid erat esse must be shown first in them: therefore. first we will say some things logically about that which is quod quid erat esse. For, as was said above, this science has sorne affinity with logic, because of the generality of both. And sa the logical mode is proper to this science, and from it it fittingly begins. But he says he is going to speak more in a logical way about the 'what the thing is', inasmuch as he investigates what quod quid erat esse is, starting from the mode of predicating [ex modo praedicandll; for this properly pertains to logic." 55 If we look back at CM 4.4 (572-577), concerning Aristotle, Metaph. 4.2 (IO04b 17 -26), we are told, in quite a long development by St. Thomas, that the dialectician and the philosopher caver the same field, but that the dialectician does so with less than scientific knowledge, treating things on the basis of their existence in notions, and not on the basis of the principles intrinsic to things themselves. The reason that the two coyer the same field is that the intelligible raies [in/enliones intelligibiles] which the dialectician studies coincide in extent with the beings of nature [entia naturae] which the philosopher studies, because ail the beings of nature fall under the consideration 53. Cf. our paper concerning this notion, mentioned in n. 1. 54. CM 7.11 (1536). 55. The underlined words, except for the first and last instances of "quod quid eral esse" represent the text of Aristotle. It is clear, then, that in metaphysics, to the extent that we have genuinely to do with the use of logical consideration, while we have what St. Thomas calls a way of beginning particularly suitable for metaphysics, we do not have scientific metaphysical procedure. 57 Now let us consider the actual use of the logical consideration which begins the metaphysical study of substance as quiddity. We might remark that, in CM 7.3 (1308), quoted above on p. 297, St. Thomas speaks as though "quad quid erat esse" ("quiddity" for short) names something which might be considered logically, or might be considered philosophically. I.e. the very term "quiddity" is not seen as exclusively pertaining to the logical consideration of substance. And this is true also in CM 7.17 (1648), quoted above on p. 295. On the other hand, at CM 8.1 (1683-1684), discussed above on p. 294, the quiddity of the natural thing is classified as substance "according to the viewpoint of the notion" [secundum ratianis acceptianem], and is contrasted with really existing substance [substantiae in rerum natura existentes ].
Here is St. Thomas paraphrasing Aristotle as actually carryîng out the logical consideration:
"But this firstly îs to be known concernîng the quad quid erat esse, that it is necessary that il be predicated accarding ta itself[secundum se]. For those things which are predicated according to accompaniment [per accidens] of somethîng do not belong to its quad quid era! esse. For by 'quad quid erat esse of something' we rnean this, viz that which can fittingly be replied to the question posed by 'what is it ?' But when we ask about something: 'what is it? ' we cannot suitably reply the things which are in it according to accompaniment ; as, when it is asked 'what is a man?', it cannot be answered that it is 'white' or 'seated' or 'musical'. And thus none of the things which are predicated according to accompaniment of sornething pertain to the quad quid erat esse of that thing : far 'ta be musical' is nat 'far yau ta be'." 58 One can see how little in the above cornes directly from Aristotle and how much is St. Thomas' presentation of Aristotle's logical consideration. It is to be noted that the term "quad quid erat esse" is from the start associated with the question: "what is it?" (which will be used in 7.17 in approaching quiddity as principle and cause).
56. CM 4.4 (576-577). Again, it is notable that Doig makes no use of these paragraphs; perhaps they have to do with the disappointment he expresses concerning 572-577 generally (cf. p. 251, n. 1).
St. Thomas in this passage does not go into the question of why there is the diversity between things in reason and things in reality; cf., on this, CM 1.10 (158). 57. Il is notable that nothing is said as to why one begins this way. 58. CM 7.3 (1309), on Aristotle at 1029b13-15. The underlined words (excepting ail but the first "quod quid eral esse") are Aristotle.
St. Thomas at this point undertakes ta explain Aristotle's use of "esse" with a dative, as in "tibi esse", "for you to be". He says:
"But it must be known that in ail the following, by the expression 'being this' [hoc esse] or 'being for this' [huic esse], he means the quod quid erat esse of that thing: for example, 'being for man' [homini esse] or 'being man' [hominem esse]: he means that which pertains to the 'what is man'."
And then he continues with the paraphrase: "Now, that which is 'being musical', i.e, the very 'what musical is', does no! pertain ta what you are. For if it be asked: 'what are you ?', it cannot be replied that you are musical. And therefore it follows that 'to be musical' is not 'for you ta be'; because those things which belong ta the quiddity of the musical are outside your quiddity, though 'musical' is predicated of you. And this is because you are not musical according ta yourself, that is, because 'musical' is not predicated of you according to itself, but according to accompaniment. That therefore pertains to the 'what it is' of you which you are according ta yourselj, that is, because it is predicated of you according to itself and not according to accompaniment: as, of you is predicated according to itself 'man', 'animal', 'substance', 'rational', 'sentient' [sensibile), and other things of this sort, which ail pertain to the 'what it is' of you." 59 We are engaged in speaking of real things, but we are considering them as they are exhibited through predication. The focus is on predicates and how they are predicated, even though it is the things spoken ofthat one wishes to know. Obviously su ch a procedure implies confidence that these discussed differences in modes of discourse reflect differences in things themselves.
What is the general effect of the logical consideration of substance as quiddity, in that portion of Book 7 which most unquestionably in volves logical consideration, viz CM 7.3-5? 60 We should note that, for St. Thomas, the target of attention in Books 7 and 8 is the formai natural principle, the substantial form. The study of quiddity is seen as an approach to the substantial form. 61 The latter is distinguished from the concrete composite: it has sorne kind of real distinguishability.62 With the recourse to quiddity, or per se predication, we have before us a distinction between a thing and what that thing is. Our discourse takes separately the two, the thing as 59. Ibid., on Aristotle at 1029b 15-16. 60. We say this most unquestionably involves logical consideration because, starting with 7.6 we enter into a discussion of generation, which extends to 7.8 inclusively; St. Thomas says nothing to exclude this from logical consideration, but it can hardi y be seen as the pure article, considering that in the next section, 7.9-12, which returns to the topic of definition, we are told that Aristotle has "descended to the natural principles which are the matter and the form ... "(see above, p. 297).1t is constantly the introduction of the natural principles (as in discussions of generation) which constitutes diminution of the logical consideration. 61. See below, pp. 304-305. 62. 1 take it that form does not really enter into the discussion of substance until malter's existence has been established (through motion, generation, and corruption). I.e., first cornes substance, then generation and corruption reveal matter (cf. CM 8.1: 1689), and then one sees that the substantia! principle must have the nature of form (i.e. something analogous to the shape of the statue, but in the order of substance) (cf. CM 7.2: 1277). subject and the "what the thing is" as predicate. Moreover, what is exhibited in this way is the unit y of such a predication. What is predicated is the very thing itself, i.e.
thing and quiddity are one in notion, and not merely by accompaniment of sorne sort. 63 In this way, we are able to contrast what has a quiddity, a true definition, with su ch realities as faU short of this sort of unit y and self-containment. There is no quiddity in the categories other than substance, or at least only quiddity in a secondary sense. 64 A notable feature of this discussion is that while at the beginning, with the talk about what can be predicated of"you" per se, one might think one was dealing with a predication such as "Socrates is aman", in fact, in the fully deve10ped logical consideration, the individu al is not in the picture. The subject is the definitum, properly so called, i.e. the species. "Man" and "man is a rational animal" : these are the objects of logical consideration. 65 But once one descends to the material individual, one is no longer having to do with the sort of unit y one observed in "man is a rational animal". The thing and its quiddity are no longer identical. Thus, in CM 7.9-12, our attention is turned from the unit y of definition with definitum to the compositeness of definition, and indeed to this as a kind of springboard to a consideration of the non-definable singular (locus of the "parts" which are not "parts of the definition") 66 -i.e. the logical consideration itse1f is used as a means of directing attention beyond mere logic.
In general, the logical consideration serves to dispiay the unit y or self-identity proper to substance. Moreover, it displays this unit y as a unit y of things, fully conceivable realities such as we commonly name in subjects and predicates. It seems to be above ail the need to take account of matter which forces the revision of this picture, and thereby forces us to the proper conception of substantial form (not a fully conceivable reality, not a predicable thing; not even a predicable thing taken abstractly, like "humanity") as cause of the unit y which is indeed found in sensible substances as they actually exist. 67 Let us look now at the philosophical consideration, in sorne of those passages in which St. Thomas is contrasting it with the logical. We will begin with St. Thomas' treatment of the passage (Aristotle, Metaph. 7.3: 1029a20-27) wherein, in order to answer those who make substance primarily or even exc1usive1y matter, Aristotle says what matter reaUy is. In St. Thomas, we find: 63. CM 7.5 (1375). 64. Cf. especially CM 7.4 (1331-134\). The key notion in these discussions is that of per se unit y :
cf. 1340. And this in turn suggests that behind ail the discussion of definition is substance as caught sight of in the theatre of generation and corruption: cf. CM 6.2 (1179). It is, therefore, we believe, too bad that Doig, in his meticulous exposition of CM 4.2 (at pp. 110-120), on the fact that the study of ens is also the study of unit y, omits aIl mention of paras. 551-552, which use generation and corruption to establish the sameness of ens and unum. 65. Cf. CM 7.\\ (1536); also, 7.5 (1378). 66. See below, pp. 307-308. 67. On the distinction between form and quiddity. see below, pp. 305-307. "Because the aforesaid argument showing that matter alone is substance seems to have proceeded from ignorance of matteL .. therefore he [AristotleJ consequently says what matter is according to the truth of things, as declared in Physics, Book 1. For matter in itself cannot sufficiently be known, except through motion; and its investigation seems to pertain especially to the natural scientist. Hence the Philosopher accepts here, concerning matter, those things which were investigated in physics, saying: 'But 1 say matter is that ;vhich according to itself, that is, considered according to its own essence, in no way is either what, i.e. substance, or quafity, or anything of the other genera by which ens is divided or determined." 68
St. Thomas thus bears down hard on the point that matter can be sufficiently known only through motion, and that Aristotle is here depending on what he has said in the Physics. And he continues:
"And this appears primarily through motion. For it is necessary that the subject of change and motion be other, speaking essentially [per se Ioquendo J, th an either of the termini of motion: as is proved in Physics 1. Hence, since matter is the first subject standing under not merely motions, which are according to quality and quantity and the other accidents, but even [under] the changes which are according to substance, it is necessary that matter be other, according to its own essence, than ail substantial forms and their privations, which are the termini of generation and corruption; and not merely that it be other th an quantity and quality and the other accidents." 69 Ali this St. Thomas has inserted in his insistence that it is through motion al one that a sufficient knowledge of the essence of matter can be had. Nothing in the text of Aristotle demanded this clarification: on the contrary, as we are about to see.
St. Thomas goes on:
"And yet, for ail that [Attamen], the Philosopher [i.e. Aristotle] does not prove the diversity of matter from ail forms through the route of motion, which proof indeed is by the route of natural philosophy, but through the route of predication, which is proper to logic, which in Book 4 of the present work he says is akin to this [present] science." 70 St. Thomas seems here somewhat taken aback by Aristotle's procedure. He go es on to explain Aristotle's argument, which supposes a real distinction between subject and predicate. St. Thomas has to relate this to what he caUs "denominative" or "concretive" predication, rather than univocal, essential predication. But it is clear that for St. Thomas, Aristotle's doctrine really depends on the physical argument. 71 To this it should be added that later (Aristotle, Metaph. 8.1: 1042a32-b8) we have matter actuaUy presented by me ans of the doctrines of the Physics, and St. Thomas once more insists: "From this argument of Aristotle, it is clear that 68. CM 7.2 (1285). The underlining is the AristotIe tex!. substantial generation and corruption are the starting-point for coming to a knowledge of first matter." 72 Thus, the procedure of Aristotle in Metaph. 7.3 is seen by St. Thomas as provision al at best. Furthermore, while we found in the foregoing no explicit formula su ch as "philosophical consideration", nevertheless we did have the contrast between Aristotle's logical procedure and the other procedure, the only one which gives "sufficient knowledge" of matter.
Having looked at the text of CM 7.2 on matter, let us look again at CM 7.11 (1535-1536). What we mean to focus upon is what characterizes the properly philosophical consideration. Previously Aristotle had not excluded material substances from his judgment that quiddity and thing are identical. St. Thomas points out that the quiddity is what is signified by the definition,73 and that the individual is not defined. 74 Thus, individual matter, which is the principle of individuation, lies outside the quiddity. But, says St. Thomas:
"it is impossible that the species be in reality [in rerum natura esse] unless in 'this individual'. Thus, it is necessary that any real thing [res naturae], if it have matter which is part of the species, which pertains to the 'what it is', also have individual matter, which does not pertain to the 'what it is'. Hence, no real thing [res naturae], if it has matter, is the very 'what it is', but is that which has it: as Socrates is not humanity, but is that which has humanity. But ifit were possible for there to be a man composed of body and soul, who were not 'this man' composed out of 'this body' and 'this soul', nevertheless he would be his quod quid erat esse, though he had matter.
[1536] But though man outside the singular does not exist really [non sit in rerum natura], he does exist in notion [est, tamen, in ratione], which pertains to logical consideration. And so above, where he [Aristotle] considered logically concerning quod quid erat esse, he did not exclude material substances, that in them also the 'what it is' be identical with that to which it belongs. For common 'man' [homo communis] is identical with his 'what it is', logically speaking. But now, after he has descended to the natural principles which are the matter and the form, and has shown how they are diversely related to the universal, and to the particular which subsists in nature [particulare quod subsistit in natura], he excepts here from that which he said above had 'what it is' identical with thing, material substances existing in reality' [substantias materiales in rerum natura existentes]. But it remains that those substances which are forms alone subsisting [formae tantum subsistentes] do not have something through which they are individuated, which is outside the notion of the thing or of the species signifying 'what it is'. And in them it is true unqualifiedly that any of them is its quod quid erat esse." 75 What Aristotle has done, in moving, "descending", from logical to philosophical consideration, is to introduce the natural principles, the matter and the form, and to show how they stand with respect to the universal, and to the particular which subsists in nature. Just as later, at 7.17, when St. Thomas wishes to exemplify what it wou Id be finally to say what in reality the quiddity is, he says : "whether it be form, or 72. CM 8.1 (1689). 73. Cf. also CM 7.5 (1378). 74. Cf. also CM 7.10 (1493-1496); but also 7.15 (1617-1618). 75. CM 7.11 (1535-1536). matter, or something like that",16 so also here we have the reference to matter and form. Similarly, when we come to Book 8, which St. Thomas presents as the major shift to philosophical consideration, we see that we are to consider the substances through their own principles, matter and form. 77 And earlier, in CM 4.4, it was the mark of the proper demonstrative sciences of the real, both "philosophy", i.e. metaphysics, and the other particular sciences, that in their study of real things [de rebus naturae] they use the principles of things, whereas the tentative dialectic, or logical consideration associated with the science of the real, made use of princip les "outside the nature of things" [extranea a natura rerum]. 78 The field of consideration of the philosopher is given, here in 7.11, as the res naturae, that which exists in rerum natura, as distinguished from that which "is, in notion". It is the same contrast, between ens naturae and ens rationis, that we saw in 4.4. 79 The issue is not materiality as such, nor even individuality, but ultimately whatever conditions prevail as regards being in reality. Again, this agrees with 7.17: the philosopher considers the existence of things, the truth of things; 80 and with 7.13, where it is said that the metaphysician, who considers things as enlia, brings the conditions of actual existence into his discourse. 81 lt is to be noted also, concerning 7.11, that when St. Thomas speaks of "res naturae" and "in rerum natura existens", the word "nature", while it may very well relate to motion, is not meant to limit the consideration to the things studied properly by the physicist, the natural philosopher. What is meant is the field of beings outside the mind, whether material or immaterial, as is shown by the conclusion concerning subsistent forms. These are res naturae. Still, the reference to nature, with its association with motion, is not accidentaI. For us, motion is the route to knowledge of actuality.82
Lastly, we should reflect that the metaphysicaljudgment involved here in Book 7 was that a thing and its quiddity are identical. Using the logical consideration, Aristotle showed this in a probable way, concerning aU entia per se. Once matter and form began to make their presence feh, the judgment had ta be revised, so as to exclu de material substances in their real existence. From a metaphysical point of view, the probable judgment will find verification unqualifiedly only with the bringing on the scene of subsisting form. 303 the mind, from the mind as taking things on its, the min d's, own terms, to a greater and greater submission to things themselves. This is brought about primarily through the consideration of motion, generation and corruption.
Professor Doig has remarked that "Aristotle ends by rejecting the entire discussion of the logical investigation, but Thomas do es not (p. 280, n. 1)". This hardly does justice to the situation. Whatever be the truth about Aristotle, St. Thomas makes il a major point that the logical consideration is inadequate, does not give us the real quiddity, and requires completion by the properly scientific metaphysical treatment.
Ill. ST. THOMAS AND SUBSTANTIAL FORM
Thusfar, we have seen that the science of metaphysics, as considerativa entis, is primarily demonstrative by means of the formai cause. We have also seen that, in his reading of the main treatment of material beings as beings in Aristotle's Metaphysics, St. Thomas saw the movement of the discussion as starting with logical consideration and ending with philosophical consideration, i.e. with the presentation of the proper principles of sensible substances, the matter and the farm and their unity. Clearly, since matter is in no way a cause of beings as beings, the primary consideration of Book 8 is of substantial form as cause of being. However, as we have also seen, the movement of Books 7 and 8 is not abrupt. Already, in Book 7, there is something of the philosophical consideration. What we wish to do in this section is to provide a few notes on St. Thomas' reading of Books 7 and 8 as a graduai manifestation of the formai cause.
a) Substantial Form the Target
It is remarkable that already, at the beginning of Book 7, St. Thomas sees the primary interest of Aristotle as bearing upon substance in the sense of subject,8l Then, in the subject, it is the substantial form which is to be the chief target of investigation. 84 St. Thomas also speaks of it as the particular farm [forma particularis].85 It is this which is presented at the very beginning, albeit in barest outline, as the cause of ens: matter is not constituted as a being actually [ens actu] except through form; thus, form is the "because of which [propter quod] ".86 And already we note even in what is a rather "physical" discussion by Aristotle (Metaph. 7.3: 1029al-9), a phenomenon we will be studying in more detail in a moment, name1y St. Thomas' careful distinction between form and species. Aristotle is using the bronze statue to convey what he means by matter, form, and composite. Concerning the form, St. Thomas seems to have read : "the shape, as the f orm of the species", and he is quick to paraphrase: "that is, giving the species". The shape is the form, and the form gives the species. St. Thomas is distinguishing between form, the physical principle, and species, the effect of the form found in our intellectual conception of the thing (the species, as we will see, is a composite of form and matter, taken universally)Y I.e., St. Thomas is already eager to distinguish what pertains more to logical consideration, the species, from what pertains to metaphysics in its properly scientific character, the substantial form.
While there is sorne ambiguity in the treatment of the division at CM 7.2 (1297 and following), the "third division" spoken of should be particular Jorm. The parts of the third division should be sensible substances and non-sensible substances, i.e. forms in matter and forms subsisting by themselves. What is to be determined concerning sensible form is the quod quid erat esse, the quiddity and essence of the thing (1299). At 1302, it is c1ear that we are after "Jormae sensibiles" which are '~formae in materia", as less remote from sense than the separate entities, and so more knowable for us. But, again, we see that even our road to the substantial forms of sensible things must pass through such non-entities or near non-entities as accidents, motion, and privations (1304).
In fact, what we learn least about here is why we are going to study the quiddity (cf. 1299). It seems to be somewhat different from substance as subject, to judge by the list given in 1270-1274. It is to be noted that here at the outset, before we enter into the full logical consideration (it would seem), quod quid erat esse is explained (1275) as something which does not fall into the order of predicaments except as formai principle. Thus, it sounds like "humanity", rather than "rational animal". It will be taken as "rational animal" in the full-tledged logical consideration (CM 7.5 : 1378).
It remains that, in the light of St. Thomas' 7.2, we are prepared for a study of substantial form. We are not going to be altogether puzzled to find quiddity as the target in 7.3, since we have been forewarned in 1299. But we cannot be altogether content. Thus, St. Thomas himself, at CM 7.13 (1566-1567), when explaining the list of modes of substance given by Aristotle at Metaph. 7.13 (1038bl-8), says that while at the beginning of Book 7 (i.e. 7.3: 1028b33-1029a2) Aristotle divided the subject in three, viz the matter, the form, and the composite, here in 7.13 he uses quod quid erat esse in place ofJorm, "because it is now c1ear that the quod quid erat esse stands on the side of form" (1567). Hence, it cannot have been all that c1ear where we are now, i.e. at 7.3, where, expecting a treatise on form, we get one on quiddity.
b) Form and Species
While the study is of quiddity, we are quickly obliged to turn our attention towards things in the concrete. Aln;ady in CM 7.6-8, on generation, This is so. 87 . See below, pp. 30b-310.
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However, the passages to which 1 wish to call attention are in 7.9-11, which we have seen St. Thomas himself describe as a des cent from the logical consideration into the natural princip les. 88 In those passages we shall look at St. Thomas' (previously mentioned) careful distinction between the species or quiddity, and the substantial form. This care of his has the effect of keeping before the mind the secondary and derivative character of the issues in Book 7 (to 7.16). Beyond the quiddity lies the substantial form, which is the real target of our metaphysical quest.
At the very beginning ofthis section of CM, i.e. in 7.9, St. Thomas explains the distinction between quiddity and substantial form. He has already presented the problem which Aristotle has proposed (and to which we will refer later), but before coming to Aristotle's solutions, he introduces a lengthy note to the reader. Concerning the definitions of things, and their essences, he tells us, there are two opinions. Sorne say that the essence of the species is the form itself: e.g. that the entire essence of man is the sou!. Thus, the words "humanity" and "soul" are understood to name exactly the same thing: it is called "form of the part" inasmuch as it perfects the matter and makes it to be actually; and it is called "form of the whole" inasmuch as through it the whole thing is given a place in a species. And thus these people maintain that no parts of the matter are posited in the definition indicating the species, but rather only the formai principles of the species. Averroes and others seem to hold this view. 89 This opinion, says St. Thomas, seems to be against the intention of Aristotle. Above, in Book 6, he said that natural things have sensible matter in their definitions. Nor can it be said that natural substances are defined by that which is not of their essences: substances do not have definition by addition (i.e. of things external to the precise thing defined), but only accidents are so defined, as was said earlier in the Metaph. Hence, it remains that sensible matter is part of the essence of natural substances, not only as regards individuals, but even as regards the very species: for 88. See above. p. 297. 89. Albert the Great seems to be among those who identify form and quiddity, to judge by his Metaphysica bk. 7, tr. l, c. 1 (ed. Cologne 1612,316.28-41). Since this passage is Albert's view of the distinction between Book 7 and Book 8, we quote at length: "Furthermore, the principles of substance are matter and form, and especially form i5 the principle of substance, and it is neces5ary that this [the form, as principle of substance] be determined in two ways: in one way, according as it is the entire being [totum esse] of first substance and its quiddity, which is signified by the definition; and it is necessary that we inquire concerning substance in this way in this 7th Book of this first philosophy. But it is to be considered in another way inasmuch as it is a certain form and nature considered in itself, diverse from matter, which is the other part of the composite, as the soul is the form of man not predicated of him, and in this way it is also called 'quiddity' by sorne, speaking broadly but improperly. And in this way we will consider form in the next book, which is the 8th Book of this first philosophy." The form and the quiddity seem to be the same thing here. At Ibid. bk. 8, tr. l, c. 1 (389.9-21), we seem to have the same position, and the sameness is rather explicit: " .. definitions are given, not of individu aIs, but of species. -Here we see that St, Thomas does not depend on his reading of Metaph. 7.10-11 for his position, but on much c1earer previous statements of Aristotle. 9o
Thus, he continues, there is another opinion, followed by Avicenna, according to which the "form of the whole", which is the very quiddity of the species, d(ffers from the "form of the part", as a who le from a part: for the quiddity of the species is a composite out of matter and form, but not, neverthe\ess, out of "this form" and "this individu al matter". Out of these, the individual, e.g. Socrates or Callias, is composed. This is the opinion of Aristotle here, says St. Thomas. Aristotle brings in this opinion (St. Thomas must mean : in a c1ear way) in order to exclude the opinion of Plato concerning the Ideas. Plato said that the species of natural things are existing by themselves without sensible matter, as though sensible matter were not in sorne way part of the species. Thus, once it is shown that sensible matter is part of the species in natural things, it is shown that it is impossible for the species of natural things to be without matter: as man without flesh and bones, etc.
Here, St. Thomas seems to be referring to what Aristotle says in 7.11, where the argument is to the point that not only in natural things, but even in mathematicals, there is a matter in the definition. Cf. Aristotle at 1036b22-30. It is of sorne importance to pin point just where Aristotle so expresses himself according to St. Thomas, since in other places in the discussion (e.g. Metaph. 7.10: 1036a 13-25) St. Thomas sees Aristotle as favouring neither opinion over the other (CM 7.10: 1498-1500). St. Thomas will, in general, interpret the discussion according to what he sees as the opinion of Aristotle, i.e. the distinction between form and quiddity of the species.
Since St. Thomas has himself called attention so explicitly and deliberately to this distinction, let us see how it shows up in his presentation of Aristotle. The phenomenon is difficult to present because of the instability of the vocabulary, as used by the two authors. The Latin Aristotle often has "species" where St. Thomas wiIJ wish to interpret by using the word "forma". St. Thomas, on the other hand, uses "species" for the quiddity as a whole. Again, Aristotle reserves, for the most part, the word "matter" to refer to what belongs to the individual as such, whereas St. Thomas, exploiting sorne few remarks of Aristotle, makes constant use of a distinction between common matter and individual matter.
Before 100 king at the texts we might recall the problems which Aristotle is facing in this part of Metaph. 7. Whereas the earlier presentation of substance and definition had focussed upon the thoroughgoing unit y of definition and definitum, the present section (Aristotle's chapters 10-12) considers definition as composite discourse, as a formula composed of parts, e.g. "rational animal". And the problem is that there does not seem to be thoroughgoing correspondence between the parts of the definition and the parts of the thing defined. Sometimes the parts of the thing are parts of the definition (as letters occur in the definition of a syllable), and sometimes they 90. CM 7.9 (1468). The point that the individual is no! defined. i! is true. is taken from a clear subsequent statement of Aristotle (7.10: 1036a2-5).
are not (the semi-circ1e is not part of the definition of the circ1e). Another problematic feature of the same situation is that sorne parts are prior to the whole (as letter to syllable) or at least simultaneous (as the heart or brain to the animal), and sorne are posterior (as finger to animal, and semi-circ1e to circ1e).91 -One of the results of the exploration of the situation so presented is that we see an ambiguity in our speech between two meanings of such words as "the circle", and so are led to distinguish two targets of attention in thought -"the circle" as the definable thing, and "the circle" as the con crete thing. 92 Another result is that we come to see that even within the definable reality as such, there is composition, there are parts, there is the structure of "this in this" (as form in matter). 93 We will look first at CM 7.10. We should note, in 1482, the reason given by St. Thomas for Aristotle's having to repeat and clarify the already given solution. Aristotle has not shown how the parts are prior and posterior, nor again has he distinguished the universal composite from the particular composite, nor also the species from the form.
Then, commenting on Aristotle at 1035b27-33, St. Thomas says:
"Nevertheless, it must be known that this composite which is animal or man can be taken in two ways: either as universal or as singular. As universal : as 'man' and 'animal'. The universally-signified species are not "substance", says Aristotle, and St. Thomas quickly identifies this "substance" as the substantial form. Then, in the next paragraph, where Aristotle might very weil seem to be distinguishing various types of part, i.e. 1035b31-33, St. Thomas rather interprets this as a distinction ofmatters. He says:
"Th us, therefore, it is clear that matter is part of the species. But 'species' we here understand not as form alone, but as quod quid erat esse. And it is clear also that matter is a part of that whole which is out of the species and the matter, i.e. the singular [whole), which signifies the nature of the species in this determinate matter. For matter is a part of the composite. But the composite is both the universal and the singular." 95 Once again, St. Thomas has Aristotle including matter in the quiddity, and setting it off carefully from the "form alone". Then, subsequently, the quiddity or species is cou pied with further matter to constitute the singular. 91. Cf. CM 7.9 (1460-1466). 92. Cf. CM 7.9 (1480-1481) concerning Aristotle at 7.10 (l035bl-J). 93. Cf. A RISTOTLE, Melaph 7.11 (1036b22-24) and CM 7.11 (1517). 94. CM 7.10 (1490). The undcrlining is the text of Aristotle. 95. CM 7.10 (1491). Aristotle underlined. Later in 7.10, commenting on the fact that the definition is of the universal only, St. Thomas explains that by the definition a thing is supposed to be known; and it is clear that when they are absent, individual things are not known, even though we still possess the definitions. Thus, the definitions do not bear directly on the individuals. And the reason for this is that matter, which is the princip le of individuation, is according to itself unknown, and is known only throughform, from which the notion of the universal is taken. And 50 singulars are not known in their absence except through universals. -Here, we see the distinction between form and universal (i.e. species) maintained: the form is the principle of the universal. 96 We shall see more of this in a moment. Still in 7.10, St. Thomas goes on to paraphrase and comment on the few words of conclusion of Aristotle at 1036aI2-13. He says:
"He [Aristotle] concludes, therefore, that it has been said how things stand concerning who/e and part, and concerning prior and posterior, i.e. of what is the part a part, and how it is prior and how posterior. For the parts of the individual matter are parts of the composite singular, but not of the species, nor of the form. But the parts of the universal matter are parts of the species, but not of the form. And because the universal is defined, and not the singular, therefore the parts of the individual matter are not placed in the definition, but only the parts of the corn mon matter, together with the form or the parts of the form." 97
Here again, we see how the analysis keeps the form clearly in view at ail times, in distinction from the species. We might notice also that the form itself is conceived by St. Thomas as susceptible ta having parts.
We move now to CM 7.11. For our present purposes, 1529-1532, wherein St. Thomas is commenting on Aristotle at 1037a21-33, is ail of interest. Aristotle is recapitulating what he has done since the beginning of Book 7. If, in the interests of brcvity, we begin at 1037 a24, we have Aristotle saying:
"And that in the notion of the substance, what so are parts, as matter, will not be included. For neither are they parts of that substance, but of the whole. But of this there is in a way a notion and there is not. For, with matter, there is not. For that is indeterminate. But according to the first substance, there is, as of man the notion of the sou!. For the substance is the species, which is within, out of which and the matter the who le substance is said." 98 And here is St. Thomas' presentation: "Also, it has been said that in the notion of the substance, i. [1531] But just as the individual is individu al through the matter, so each thing is placed in its species through the form. For man is not man because he has flesh and bones but from this, that he has rational soul in flesh and bones. Whence it is necessary that the definition of the species be taken from the form, and that in the definition of the species be placed only those parts of matter in which the form is primarily and principally. As the notion of man is that which is of the soul. For from this, man is man, that he has such a sou!. And because of this, if man is defined, it is necessary that he be defined through the soul, and that nevertheless in his definition be placed the parts of the body in which primarily is the soul, such as the heart or the brain, as he said above. "[ 1532] For the very substance of which matter is not a part is the species, i.e. the form, which is within the matter, out of which form and the matter the whole substance is said, i.e. is determined and defined ... " 99 The reader can see how relentlessly St. Thomas maintains the distinction between species and form, with the idea that the species inc1udes matter, and that thus matter is part of the definition. Even where the text of Aristotle has "species", St. Thomas does not hesitate to say it means "form".
The result of ail this is that St. Thomas keeps a firm ho Id on the distinction between logical consideration, to which properly the species belongs, and philosophical consideration, to which belong matter and form as principles of the composite substance. The species is the individu al composite taken universally. The real ground for 50 taking it is the particular form.
c) Form and Causality
We have done enough to illustrate how St. Thomas, even within CM 7, keeps in view the distinction between quiddity and form, between "substance according to reason" and "substance as it exists".loo We wish now to reconsider the second c1ear step towards the real principles of things noted by St. Thomas himself in his interpretation of Aristotle, viz the "new beginning" in 7.17.
Why is this such a new beginning? We have seen that it is a beginning other than the logical one, and that it consists precisely in saying that within the substance, there is a principle, a cause. lOI While from our point of view (that of interest in the substantial form) the word "in" or "within" is highly interesting,102 nevertheless it is the notion of cause and principle which St. Thomas seems ta be regarding as innovative here. Thus, he divides 7.17 into the two points: that the quiddity is cause and principle; and what sort of cause and princip le it is (1649). This point was mentioned at the beginning of Book 7, but our treatise has been dominated by quiddity as definition. 103 From this point of view, the quiddity seems ta stand by itself in a sort of intelligible sphere. Its notional separability is exploited to the utmost, and rather than appear as cause or principle, it seems more to appear as substance itself, with the particular as something more like an attendent shadow than as an effect.
That the new approach, the causal, is new is illustrated in a way by the mode of exemplification now employed. Typical is the house and its construction. 104 We are in the domain of events, of generation and corruption. Even though it is the intrinsic cause which mainly interests us, it is by the consideration of the assembling and disassembling of things that we catch sight of the causal contribution. 105 Generation as an approach to ens as ens has been present in the background all along. 106 N ow it is coming forward.
The challenge for the formulator of this doctrine is to put the notion of cause to work even within substance. This is a challenge because it would seem that substance involves simplicity whereas causality in volves composition. Thus, as regards substance, one sees the problem presented in 7.17, that it does not appear to be a cause at ail: this is presented by means of the simplicity of the question which inquires about the substance, viz "what is it1" (1662) (1663) (1664) (1665) (1666) (1667) (1668) . And yet there is already the clue, in the way the mere logician speaks about causes generally, i.e. "because of what is AB?", thus using the "what" to name what are manifestly causes, namely the agent and the end, that the true "what", i.e. the substance, has the nature of a cause (cf. 1656-1661).
That causality involves composition is brought out in CM 7.17 (1649-1655) : that causal inquiry is always about a duality: why A is B.
The picture of the quiddity (still considered as that which corresponds to the question: "what is it ?") as cause already brings in the role of matter (1667 -1668). And one might weil wonder what more there is to say about the quiddity as cause -a sort of "influence" of form on matter. And yet St. Thomas designates the considerable passages of 7.17 which remain (i.e. 1672-1680) as treating of what sort of cause or principle quiddity is. The problem seems ta be that once one locales the causa lit y of the quiddity as intrinsic, one runs the risk of confusing its proper causal contribution with that of the matter. Thus Aristotle calls our attention to the mode of unit y which is unqualified unit y . And he points out that such a unit is not merely its elements, but that inasmuch as one can have the elements and not have the unit, it is seen that there 103. Cf. CM 7.5 (1378 is "something else" within the unit. This something else cannot be conceived as an element, that is, as a cause after the manner of matter. (1675-1677) Rather, it is the principle and cause of being (1679).
We should note, at this point in CM, on the very threshold of Book 8, and with the very words of Aristotle, the way St. Thomas insists upon the need to locate this sort of substance (i.e. the cause of being), not just anywhere, but in natural things:
"Therefore, he [Aristotle] says that because some things are not substances, as is particularly c1ear in the case of artifacts, but whatever are according to nature, as regards being, and constituted by nature, as regards becoming, are true substances, il will be manifest that this nature which we have sought is substance in some, viz in natural, things, and not in aIl. Which nature, also, is not an e/em en t, but the formai principle ... " (1680)
We come strongly to the viewpoint of nature and generation. d) Book 8
Lastly, in this section, we will consider a few aspects of Book 8. One is the use St. Thomas makes of the word "principium". We have already seen that St. Thomas regards the move to Book 8 as a move "towards existing natural things" [ad res naturales existentes].107 He says that here Aristotle intends to treat of them "through their own principles" [per propria principia], which, as we have also seen, is the procedure of the philosopher in his scientific or demonstrative phase. 108 Thc word "principium" is repeated surprisingly often in St. Thomas' presentation of Aristotle here in Book 8. Thus, wc read: " ... here the Philosopher begins to treat of sensible substances by inquiry into their princip/es. "And it is divided into two parts. In the first, he determines concerning the matter and the form, which are the principles of sensible substances. In the second, concerning their union with each other. "Regarding the first point he does two things. First he shows that mattcr is principle of sensible substances. Secondly he shows the same about form." (CM 8.1: 1686) Then, at the beginning of the next leetio, we read: "After the Philosopher has sought out the material principle in sensible substances, here he inquires into the formai principle ... " ... First, he investigates the differences in sensible things, which demonstrate the formai principle ... " (CM 8.2: 1691-1692) And, in the next lectio:
"After the Philosopher has sought out the princip/es of sensible substance, showing that the sensible substance is composed out of matter and form, now he intends to determine concerning the material and the formai principles, inquiring as to those things which are to be considered about each. "And it is divided into two parts. In the first he inquires as to those things which are to be considered about the formai principle. In the second, those things which are to be considered about the material principle ... "And because Plato most especially touched upon the formai principle, therefore he determines concerning the formaI principle according ta those things which Plato held. Thus, the first part is divided into two parts. "In the first he determines concerning the formaI principle by comparison with the Ideas. In the second, by comparison with numbers." (CM 8.3: 1703-1704) At this point. as St. Thomas begins his explanations, this insistence on the full formula is left aside. However, as we begin the next lectio (4), "principium formale" and "principium materiale" (especially) come in for extraordinarily heavy use, extending right into the commentary (cf. 1729-1732). And, lastly, they are used once again in the introduction to the last lectio (CM 8.5: 1755). This use of "principium" corresponds, it seems to us, not only to the "new beginning" we saw in 7.17, with quiddity now taken as formai principle of being, but also to the idea that we are now working with existing natural substance. The hope is to avoid the picture of form as a substance in its own right, a picture so much encouraged by the definitional approach. St. Thomas is here very much in accord with the doctrine he expressed earlier, in the part of Book 7 dealing with quiddity and generation:
"Matter and form ... are not substances, except insofar as they are the principles of composite substance." 109 Thus, also, here in 8.1, in explaining the division of substance into matter, form, and composite, and their status as substances, the composite appears to get the primary role:
"But the composite out of these is said to be substance as separable unqualifiedly, that is, capable of existing by itse1f separately in reality; and of it alone there is generation and corruption." (1687)
St. Thomas thus paraphrases the Latin Aristotle's "separabile simpliciter" [separable unqualifiedly] with the unusually explicit formula: "separatim per se existere potens in rerum natura" [capable of existing by itself separately in reality]. And our inclination is to see the reference to generation and corruption (which, of course, is in Aristotle) as a way of pointing out that this is the thing which is, in the primary sense of "iS".110
We see this aspect of the situation still more evidently when we consider that in Book 8 the first step is the presentation of the material principle. It is arrived at through the consideration of substantial generation and corruption. As St. Thomas says:
109. CM 7.6 (1386).
110. Cf. CM 7.1 (1256) and 6.2 (1179); also 4.2 (551-552).
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"From this argument of Aristotle it is apparent that substantial generation and corruption are the starting-point for coming to the knowledge of prime matter." (CM 8.1: 1689) Clearly then, it is of substance as caught sight of with the help of generation and corruption that we have to do here.
We saw at the outset that matter is not a cause ofbeings as beings. However, it is only inasmuch as we distinguish between matter and form, as a compositionfound in existing substances, that we can have the duality required to see the causality of form. And in 8.2, we have the presentation of form, by means of the differences found among things. Aristotle's approach to the question by using Democritus, and the subsequent use of ex amples in artifacts and natural things, puts us very much into the more "physical" realm. N evertheless, the definitional approach is mixed in as weil. III Thus, we find St. Thomas paraphrasing Aristotle as follows:
"He shows how the aforementioned differences are reIated to substances; and he says : from the foregoing it is now clear that in the aforementioned differences is to be sought that which is the formaI cause of being [causaformalis essendr] of any of the aforesaid, of which they are the differences, ifthings are such that the formaI substance [substantia formalis] or 'what it is' is the cause of any being [causa cuiuslibet essendl], as was shown in Book 7. For the aforesaid differences signify the form and the 'what it is' of the aforementioned things. However, none of the aforesaid differences is substance, nor anything near to substance (as pertaining to the genus of substance). But the same proportion is found in them as is found in substance.
[1697] For Just as in the genus of substance, the difference, which is predicated of the genus, and cornes to it for the constituting of the species, is compared to it as act and form, so a/so in the other definitions." 112 Here, St. Thomas is impelled to add: "But III one ought not to understand that the difference is the form, or that the genus is the matter, since the genus and the differences are predicated of the species, but the matter and the form are not predicated of the composite; but this is said because the genus is taken from that which is material in the thing, while the difference is taken from that which is formaI. For example, the genus of man is 'animal', because it signifies 'something having a sentie nt nature'; which [sentient nature] indeed stands materially towards the intellective nature, from which is taken 'rational', which is the difference of man; but 'rational' signifies 'something having an intellective nature'. And thus it is that the genus has the differences potentially, and that the genus and the difference are proportionate to the matter and the form, as Porphyry says. And for that reason also it is said here that the act, that is, the difference, is predicated of the matter, i.e. the genus; and similarly in the other genera". (1697) St.Thomas, as he indicates by the paraphrase quoted first, would have liked Aristotle to say that "the difference, which is predicated of the genus, ... is compared to it as act and form ... " But what he finds in the text is that "that which is predicated of the matter is aCI". I.e. Aristotle said that the act is predicated of the matter. He is, in St.Thomas' eyes, mixing a way ofspeaking which pertains to the logical, definitional, or predicational approach, with the considerations (matter, and act or form) proper to the philosophical approach. St. Thomas puts first in his paraphrase what he would like to have found, then explains the situation to the reader, and lastly introduces the actual text. He painstakingly distinguishes the factors pertaining to the two domains.
St. Thomas is determined not to confuse what pertains to logical consideration with the knowledge of the proper principles of the existing natural thing. In insisting that he is speaking about the principles, St. Thomas never allows them to be envisaged as mere duplicates of the subsisting thing.
Besides the scrupulous use of "principium", another important point in Book 8 Îs the key role of the notion of matter for the conception of form as cause of beÎng. Besides the already-mentioned fact that we begin the discussion with matter, this point can perhaps be heightened by a brief consideration of CM 8.3 (1713). There the Platonists are complimented for having said that the hou se is not stone and composition, as though the house were constituted out of these as out of parts of matter. If this were so, i.e. if the form were one of the parts of matter, it would depend on matter. And we see that this is false, says St. Thomas, because the composition and the mixture, which are the formaI princip les [formalia principia], are not constituted out of the things which are composed or are mixed, just as neither is anything else formaI constituted out of its matter, but rather the converse. Being-athreshold is constituted by position, which is its form, and not vice versa.
The point that the form is the cause of being is seen to the extent that the ontological indetermination of matter is seen. It must be grasped as the character of the effect as an effect, so that the form will be the cause of being. And it is the development of the notion of matter in the light of generation and corruption which brings about the vision of the required dependent nature. Thus it is se en that form is truly the cause, within the ens, of nothing short of its being ens. 114 lt is not at ail necessary to have a form capable of separa te existence, in order to see that the form is the cause of being. It is only necessary to grasp the ontological character of matter, and to see form, then, as something quite distinct. Even a form whose being is so inseparable from matter that it cannot be conceived without matter 115 nevertheless appears as cause of being of the whole composite.
Lastly, concerning the final/eclio of Book 8, in which the union of the material and formaI princip les is presented, we should note to what extent we have once again the problems of definition, as presented in Book 7, mixed in with the presentation. Of course, the same mixture was found in Book 7 itself: e.g. in CM 7.11, we had the same sort of presentation of the solution in natural things (1516-1519), then in mathematicals (1520-1522), as we have here in 8.5: i.e. natural things in 1759, mathematicals in 1760, and separate entity in 1762.
But this very mixture in the Aristotelian text suggests the extent to which St. Thomas' insistence on the move from logical to existential consideration as the movement of the Metaphysics, is an interpretation, and probably involves a certain ingredient of what "ought to be found in Aristotle", in St. Thomas' judgment.
